Election Audit for Paxton-Talarico Underway
Austin, TX – Texas is opening the books on its first statewide risk-limiting election audit, and the results of the U.S. Senate race between Ken Paxton and James Talarico are at the center of the exercise. The state says the process will use randomly selected paper ballots, hand counts and statistical calculations to determine whether the reported election outcome can be independently verified. But there are still some basic questions Texans deserve answered, including exactly how many ballots will be examined and how the public can independently reproduce the selection process.
Secretary of State Robert S. Howden announced November 16 that the November 3 general election would undergo two separate post-election reviews. The statewide Risk-Limiting Audit, or RLA, will examine the Senate contest. A separate county-level post-election hand count will examine selected races at designated voting locations.
This is the first statewide implementation of the RLA requirements adopted through legislation in 2021. The Legislature gave the state five years to put the system into operation. That deadline has arrived.
How does the audit work?
The process begins with something called a ballot manifest. Each county prepares an inventory identifying its paper ballots, how they are organized, and where they are stored. Those records are submitted to the Secretary of State through Arlo, an open-source election audit software program.
The state then uses a randomly generated “seed” to direct the software’s selection of ballots. County election officials retrieve the designated physical ballots, examine the actual voter selections, and enter the results into the software. Arlo calculates whether the evidence supports the reported election outcome.
The procedure is designed to test the paper ballots against the electronic results, rather than simply asking election officials to run the same electronic totals through another computer.
A seed is essentially a starting number for a mathematical process called a pseudo-random number generator. Once entered with the appropriate ballot inventory and other audit parameters, it produces a reproducible sequence used to select ballots. Anyone with the same inputs and software configuration should be able to reproduce the selection.
What happened with the seed?
The November 16 Secretary of State press release described a 10-digit seed. A subsequent announcement identified a 20-digit seed, creating an inconsistency in the state’s public communications.
On November 18, Howden conducted the public selection event using a series of 10-sided dice rolls. Houston Public Media reported Thursday morning that the selection was broadcast live.
The 20-digit description appeared in subsequent public reporting about the event. However, the final numerical seed and a complete independently reproducible ballot-selection file have not yet been established in the published records reviewed for this report.
That information should be made available. Transparency should mean more than watching somebody roll dice on a livestream.
How many ballots will be examined?
This is the biggest unanswered numerical question.
The state has not published a verified statewide initial sample size or a final number of ballots to be examined. The number is determined through the statistical audit process, not by a simple requirement to count a fixed percentage of every county’s ballots.
The sample can expand if the initial examination does not provide sufficient statistical evidence to confirm the reported outcome. The Secretary of State’s August training presentation illustrates the retrieval of specific ballots from identified batches, followed by manual counting and statistical evaluation.
Consequently, anyone claiming that a specific number of Texas ballots will be examined should be able to produce the official Arlo selection results supporting that figure.
Where will the ballots be examined?
All Texas counties subject to the law must participate, regardless of the voting equipment or counting method they use. County election custodians conduct the physical examination, and the state coordinates the statewide selection.
Public notices identify several locations. Cameron County scheduled its examination for 9 a.m. Thursday at the Dancy Building. Collin County posted a notice identifying its Elections Department in McKinney, while Williamson County scheduled its examination at its Georgetown elections office. Tarrant County posted a separate notice for 8 a.m. Friday, November 20, in Fort Worth.
These are county audit locations, not a complete list of the ballots selected statewide. The Secretary of State’s training materials say the process is open to poll watchers, although general public attendance may be restricted by individual county arrangements.
What happens if the audit finds discrepancies?
The audit does not automatically produce a recount whenever a hand-counted ballot differs from an electronic record. The software evaluates the discrepancies against the statistical requirements. Additional ballots may be selected when the evidence is insufficient.
If the audit cannot establish the required statistical assurance, the process can escalate to a full hand count.
Texas Election Code Section 127.304 requires the Secretary of State to publish the audit results online within three days after completion. Section 127.306 prohibits the Secretary from waiving the statutory audit requirements.
There is another review coming. The separate county post-election hand-count program must begin after the Secretary of State certifies completion of the RLA, with the applicable completion deadline extending to December 3 or a later date designated by the state.
For Texans, this is about more than Paxton or Talarico. Elections are the foundation of representative government, and public confidence cannot be demanded by government officials. It has to be earned through verifiable procedures and accessible records.
The state has taken an important step by implementing the audit required by law. But a livestream, a software program and a press release are not substitutes for publishing the actual results.
Texans should be able to see which ballots were selected, how many were examined, what discrepancies were found and whether the final statistical test was satisfied. No political party should have a monopoly on asking those questions.
The ballot belongs to the voter. The records belong to the public. And the government has an obligation to show its work.
Questions & Answers
1. What election is Texas auditing in November 2026?
The Texas Secretary of State selected the November 3, 2026 U.S. Senate race between Republican Ken Paxton and Democrat James Talarico for the statewide Risk-Limiting Audit.
2. How many ballots will be hand-counted in the Paxton–Talarico audit?
The final number has not been established in the publicly available records reviewed for this report. The sample is statistically determined and can expand if additional examination is necessary.
3. What is the 20-digit seed used for in the Texas election audit?
The seed is the starting input for a pseudo-random number generator in the Arlo audit software. It determines which physical ballots are selected for examination and allows the selection process to be reproduced using the same inputs.
4. Where are Texas election officials conducting the audit?
County election custodians conduct the physical ballot examinations. Public notices identify locations in Cameron, Collin, Williamson and Tarrant counties, among others. All counties subject to the statewide audit must participate.
5. What are the sources for the Texas Senate election audit?
The primary references are the Texas Secretary of State’s November 16 audit announcement, its November 10 instructions to county election officials, its August 2026 Risk-Limiting Audit training presentation, Texas Election Code Chapter 127, and Houston Public Media’s November 19 reporting.
- Texas Secretary of State, November 16 announcement
- Secretary of State, Risk-Limiting Audit training presentation
- Secretary of State, county audit instructions
- Texas Election Code, Chapter 127
- Houston Public Media, November 19 report
- Texas Association of County Election Officials, audit explanation
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